Predicting Faking Using the Faking Dispositions and Reactions Questionnaire (FDRQ)

Stephanie N. Seiler
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Nathan R. Kuncel
University of Minnesota

Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Society for Industrial and

Organizational Psychology, New York, NY, April 2007.

ABSTRACT

A relatively new line of research has demonstrated that applicants' dispositions and reactions predict faking on an applicant personality test. In the current investigation, I attempted to predict score elevation in a simulated applicant setting using a previously developed measure, the Faking Dispositions and Reactions Questionnaire (FDRQ).

Predicting Faking Using the Faking Dispositions and Reactions Questionnaire (FDRQ)

Personality testing has been shown to be one of the more poorly received methods of employee selection among applicants (Rosse, Miller, & Stecher, 1994). Negative reactions are associated with decreased test-taking motivation (Rynes & Connerly, 1993), withdrawal from the application process (Chan, Schmitt, Jennings, Clause, & Delbridge, 1998; Rynes & Connerly, 1993), and a lowered intention to recommend the organization to others (Chan et al., 1998; Gilliland, 1994; Ployhart & Ryan, 1998; Rynes & Connerly, 1993; Schmit & Ryan, 1997).

Ingerick, McFarland, Vasilopoulos, and Cucina (2004) demonstrated that an individual's reactions regarding the validity and fairness of a personality assessment are related to faking behavior. Research has also demonstrated that individual *dispositions*, such as perceptions regarding dishonest responding, as well as certain personality traits such as low conscientiousness, may predict response distortion on a personality test (McFarland, 2000; Mueller-Hanson, Heggestad, & Thornton, 2003; Snell, Sydell, & Lueke, 1999). Given these findings, we have previously integrated the literature and utilized factor analytic techniques to develop a faking dispositions and test reactions measure (Faking Dispositions and Reactions Questionnaire, FDRQ; Seiler & Kuncel, 2005) towards the goals of developing a revised model of faking determinants and predicting faking behavior on a personality test. Overall, we have found support for the general model proposed by Ingerick et al. (2004), which argues that the determinants of faking behavior can be categorized in terms of dispositions and reactions. Additionally, we have revised the Ingerick et al. (2004) model, in particular by expanding the breadth of the dispositional component and examining relationships among the factors composing

reactions. Readers interested in more on the theory behind the development of the FDRQ or the methods utilized to create the measure should review Seiler & Kuncel's (2005) paper.

Each FDRQ factor comprises multiple, lower-order content areas. Following are definitions of each content area which composes the FDRQ, v.1.2, as well as a representative item from that content area.

1. Attitude Toward Faking (AF). A Dispositional variable that represents an overall evaluation of the behavior of faking. The attitude toward faking content area closely models the attitude component of the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1985). A representative item is, "Lying on the test would be a good thing to do." All items were taken from McFarland's (2000) scale and adapted for the purposes of the current investigation.
2. Subjective Norms (SN). A Dispositional variable that represents the perceived social pressure to perform or not perform a behavior. The subjective norms content area closely models the subjective norms component of the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1985). A representative item is, "If I lied on the test, most of the people who are important to me would disapprove." All items were taken from McFarland's (2000) scale and adapted for the purposes of the current investigation.
3. Perceived Behavioral Control (PC). A Dispositional variable that indicates one's belief regarding how easy or difficult a behavior is to perform in the presence of personal or situational barriers. The perceived behavioral control content area content area closely models the attitude component of the theory

of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1985). A representative item is, "An employer could not prevent me from lying on the test." All items were taken from McFarland's (2000) scale and adapted for the purposes of the current investigation.

4. Moral Obligation (MR). A Dispositional variable that represents one's values and principles regarding the behavior of faking. A representative item is, "Lying on the instrument would go against my principles." Three of the four items were adapted from the three-item scale used in Beck and Ajzen (1991); an additional item was written specifically for the FDRQ, v.1.2.
5. Intention to Fake (INT). A Dispositional variable that signifies one's likelihood of engaging in faking behavior in the future. The intention to fake content area models the intention component of the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1985). A representative item is, "I would respond dishonestly on the assessment if I really wanted a particular job." All items were taken from McFarland's (2000) scale and adapted for the purposes of the current investigation.
6. Perceived Ability (PA). A Dispositional variable that signifies one's belief regarding how his/her completely honest responses on a personality test would look to an employer. A representative item is "I would look like a good employee just responding honestly on the assessment." All items were written specifically for the FDRQ.
7. Predictive Validity (PV). A Reactive variable that indicates one's evaluation of the actual utility of the assessment. A representative item is, "I am

confident that the assessment can predict how well an applicant will perform on the job." Items were adapted from Smither et al. (1993) and Glode (2002). Similar items were utilized in Ingerick et al. (2004).

8. Face Validity (FV). Signifies one's evaluation of how well the content of a personality test is related to behaviors that are required in a job. A representative item is, "The actual content of the personality instrument is clearly related to job tasks." Items were adapted from Smither et al. (1993).
9. Fairness Perceptions (FP). A Reactive variable that signifies one's evaluation of the appropriateness of using the assessment to select employees. A representative item is, "I feel that using the test to select applicants for a job is unfair." Items were adapted from Smither et al. (1993), Glode (2002), Rynes and Connerly (1993), and Ryan and Sackett (1987). Similar items were utilized in Ingerick et al. (2004).
10. Detection (DET). Represents an individual's belief that employers or psychologists are able to detect dishonest responding. A representative item is, "Employers are able to detect when someone is faking his or her responses." Items were taken from McFarland (2000) and Snell et al. (1999) and adapted for the purposes of the current investigation.
11. Motivation (MOT). Represents one's desire to do well on the assessment. A representative item is "I would want to be among the top scorers on the test." Items are from the motivation items of the Test Attitudes Survey (Arvey, Strickland, Drauden, & Martin, 1990) and adapted for the purposes of the current investigation.

Factor analysis supports a three-factor solution comprised of the lower-level content areas. The first factor is labeled Faking Dispositions. It generally reflects statements about likely response strategies on a personality test. The second factor is Test Outcomes. It reflects the perceived predictive validity and fairness of the test. An individual scoring highly on Test Outcomes is likely to understand the link between personality test performance and job performance. Interestingly, items assessing the perceived Face Validity of personality tests do not all load on this second factor. A third factor, labeled Employer Test Valuation, was also determined to warrant future investigation. It contains items from the content areas of perceived ability and motivation, as well as some of the items from the face validity content area. We loosely interpret this factor to represent an individual's beliefs that the items on a personality test assess important job-related content. This belief in face validity should motivate a person to want to score highly on a personality assessment. The perceived ability loadings are more difficult to interpret. We speculate that those high in perceived ability are more likely to see the items on a personality test as relevant to their own performance (face validity) and will thus want to score highly on the assessment (motivation), while those low in perceived ability might see the test as containing items irrelevant to their own (although equally high) performance. Interestingly, motivation is also related to the desire to respond honestly, which runs counter to the arguments put forth by Mueller-Hanson et al. (2003) and McFarland and Ryan (2000). Those with a lower perceived ability and perception of face validity might not believe that an employer will use this information as a major factor in deciding which applicants to hire. It might be important

to further examine the meaning of this potential third factor, including the causal linkages among these variables.

Given the results above demonstrating interpretable dispositional and reactive factors that are likely to be related to faking behavior, it seemed reasonable to proceed in the prediction of faking in a laboratory study.

Participants

Participants were 120 Introductory Psychology undergraduates from a large Midwestern university who participated in order to fulfill a course requirement. Approximately 36% of the participants reported having previous experience with job applicant personality testing. 71% of the participants reported their race as White/Caucasian. 46% of the participants were male. The average age was 18.8, with a range from 17 to 22. 50% of the sample had 1-3 years of experience working. 30% had more than 3 years of work experience. The remaining participants had less than a year of work experience (16%) or no work experience (4%).

Materials

FDRQ, v.1.2. Before completing the FDRQ, v.1.2, participants first read a sample of items from a personality test used for selection and were asked to imagine what they would think if an employer asked them to take this type of test. Responses were made on a 6-point scale, ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. The items in the questionnaire were presented in random order. The FDRQ, v.1.2 is shown in Table 1.

Personality. Personality was measured using the 70-item Inventory of Personal Characteristics #7 (IPC7; Tellegen, Grove, & Waller, 1991). Participants rate the degree to which a word or phrase describes them, using a 4-point scale ranging from Strongly

Disagree to Strongly Agree. Five of the seven factors of the IPC7 can be used as approximate measures of the Big Five personality traits (McCrae & Costa, 1995). Positive Emotionality is related to what is commonly labeled Extraversion. Negative Emotionality relates to the Big Five trait of Neuroticism. Conventionality is the negative pole of what is commonly labeled Openness to Experience. The factors Conscientiousness and Agreeableness are similar to the corresponding Big Five traits. The remaining two factors, Positive Valence and Negative Valence, are evaluative (as opposed to substantive) descriptions of the self that are not part of the Big Five (McCrae & Costa, 1995). Positive Valence reflects a self-evaluation of desirable aspects of character, including one's importance, significance, and deservingness of admiration. Negative Valence reflects a self-evaluation of the undesirable aspects of character, including one's wickedness, nastiness, and deservingness of hatred.

All seven IPC-7 factors were included for descriptive purposes; however, the Conscientiousness factor is the focus of the current investigation. This factor is of interest in faking research given its strong relationship with work performance (Barrick & Mount, 1991; Barrick, Mount, & Judge, 2001) and thus its common use as a selection variable. Research also fairly consistently finds large Honest/Applicant mean differences for Conscientiousness (see meta-analysis by Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999).

Procedure

The study consisted of two sessions, with a minimum 3-day interval between sessions. Sessions were counterbalanced to control for possible order effects.

During their first session, all participants were told that they would be completing personality measures under different sets of instructions. As an incentive for their

attentive responses during our study, they were offered a personal summary of the results of each personality inventory completed. Only six (5%) of the participants requested a summary. In one session, participants completed the FDRQ, v.1.2, as well as the IPC7 under "honest" instructions. Participants received the following instructions:

> "We would like you to think for a moment about your experiences as an employee. If you don't have any work experiences, think about any experiences you have had that are similar to work. Please take a moment to think about yourself as an employee." <pause briefly>
>
> "We would like you to complete the two questionnaires in this packet in relation to your qualities as an employee. Please respond honestly." [1]

Half of the participants completed the FDRQ first; the other half completed the IPC7 first.

---

1 Typically, when researchers examine differences in criterion-related validity between applicants and a control group, or operationalize within-subject faking, the "honest" instructions do not ask the participants to respond in relation to their personality at work (e.g., Mueller-Hanson et al., 2003; Ingerick et al., 2004). Research suggests that providing a work frame of reference for personality items results in stronger validity coefficients (e.g., English, 2001; Robie, Born, & Schmit, 2001; Schmit, Ryan, Stierwalt, & Powell, 1995). It thus seems reasonable to assume that operationalizing faking as an applicant-honest difference score makes more conceptual sense when the honest instructions have been framed in terms of work behaviors.

In the other session, participants again responded to the IPC7. This time, they were instructed to respond to the questions while imagining that they are taking a test as part of a job application process. Participants received the following instructions:

> "We would like you to imagine that you are applying for a job. Your potential employer has just asked you to complete a personality assessment. The employer will use the score on this assessment to determine whether or not to grant you an employment interview. Please take a moment to imagine this situation." <pause briefly>
>
> "We would like you to complete the two questionnaires as a job applicant. That is, imagine that you are applying for a job and the employer asks you to answer the following questions."

Finally, participants completed a general demographic questionnaire.

Results

Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics relevant to the laboratory study. As expected, the mean Conscientiousness score for the applicant condition is higher than the mean score for the honest condition. However, the magnitude of the difference is relatively small (Cohen's d = .22). It can also be seen that, in support of the use of difference scores to operationalize score elevation, the reliability of the Conscientiousness differences score is comparable to the reliability of its component scores. It can also be noted that the correlation between applicant and honest Conscientiousness scores approached zero (r = -.00). Taken together, these results indicate that participants did not adopt a single, common response strategy.[2] While some

participants did elevate their scores, others responded consistently across conditions, and still others actually decreased their scores. To reiterate, the current study focuses on one common and simple operationalization of faking—score elevation.

Table 3 displays the correlations of Faking Dispositions, Test Outcomes, and Test Valuation with Conscientiousness score elevation. It can be seen that the relationships of the factors with Conscientiousness score elevation are relatively small (Faking Dispositions, r = .02; Test Outcomes (reverse), r = .20; Test Valuation, r = -.12). Only the Test Outcomes effect was statistically significant at $p < .05$.

Although Faking Dispositions alone did not correlate with Conscientiousness score elevation, we considered the possibility that a Test Outcomes x Faking Dispositions interaction might add incrementally to the prediction of Conscientiousness score elevation. An interaction term was calculated from centered variables ($Xi - X_{bar}$) to reduce potential problems related to multicollinearity. Results are displayed in Table 4. As expected, it can be seen that Faking Dispositions did not add substantially to the prediction of score elevation ($\Delta R^2 = .01$). The effect does not increase when an interaction term is included in the prediction equation ($\Delta R^2 = .01$). Therefore, we did not consider it necessary to include either Faking

---

2 We tested whether an order effect (Applicant instructions first/Feedback Only instructions first) was present and might have accounted for the small mean difference between the Applicant and Feedback Only conditions. This effect size was relatively small (Cohen's d = .18). The mean conscientiousness difference score for the group completing the Feedback Only session first (0.15) did not differ statistically from the mean conscientiousness difference score for the group completing the Applicant session first (0.04; $p>.05$).

Dispositions or the Test Outcomes x Faking Dispositions interaction term in the subsequent regression analysis.

Next, we considered whether Test Valuation would provide incremental prediction over Test Outcomes. Test Valuation did not add to the prediction of score elevation ($\Delta R^2 = .00$). However, a Test Outcomes x Test Valuation interaction did add incrementally to the prediction of Conscientiousness score elevation ($\Delta R^2 = .05$). Results are presented in Table 5.

Finally, although the factor analyses of the FDRQ indicate no more than five or six factors, it is still possible that differential relationships with Conscientiousness score elevation might emerge for each content area composing a factor. Table 6 presents these correlations. One relationship of interest is that attitude toward faking, moral convictions, and intention correlated with score elevation, while subjective norms did not. These differential relationships would explain the low correlation between Faking Dispositions and score elevation. Future investigation of these differential relationships would be profitable.

Additional Findings

Sixty-one (61) participants reported their cumulative college GPA. The correlation between honest Conscientiousness scores and GPA was .21, while the correlation for applicant Conscientiousness scores was -.14. Mueller-Hanson et al. (2003) reported a correlation between achievement motivation and performance of .17 for a control group that was asked to complete the measure honestly, and a correlation of .05 for an applicant group that was told their scores would be used to select them for a paid study.)

In the current study, we have identified the factors that are related to Conscientiousness score elevation, a common operationalization of faking behavior. The two reactive factors, Test Outcomes and Test Valuation, were related to Conscientiousness difference scores, while Faking Dispositions was not. The reactive factor correlations are similar in magnitude and direction to the content area correlations with Conscientiousness score elevation found by Ingerick et al. (2004). Although Faking Dispositions did not correlate with score elevation, the Dispositions content areas of attitudes and intention did correlate with score elevation, similar to the relationships found by McFarland (2000). The subjective norms content area was related to score elevation in McFarland (2000) but not in the present study. The moral convictions content area, which was not included in McFarland (2000), was also related to score elevation. Future research should explore the factor structure of Faking Dispositions and the possible differential relationships of its content areas with faking behavior.

Conclusions based on this study are limited by the relatively small sample size. However, the factor structure of the Faking Dispositions and Reactions Questionnaire (FDRQ) did remain relatively constant across two independent investigations, and the magnitude and direction of the factor relationships with Conscientiousness score elevation are similar to those found in previous research. It should also be noted that the empirical results are limited to the population of college students in a simulated applicant condition. It would be in error to generalize any detected effects to non-college students or to true applicant populations.

Conclusions based on this study are also limited to the operationalization of faking as a Conscientiousness difference score. Conscientiousness was chosen because

of its relevance to work performance; however, the lack of consensus on an appropriate operationalization of the term faking and of other response strategies is a serious barrier in this line of research. Score elevation is the operationalization most often adopted by faking researchers, even though it has been noted that there are likely a number of response strategies adopted by applicants. Some individuals will report accurate self-descriptions throughout; others will strive to be accurate, but may stretch the truth on certain items in order to create a slightly better impression; still others will elevate their scores as much as possible on all items in order to obtain the job (Levin & Zickar, 2002). A more complex model of faking and other response strategies is long overdue.

Finally, this research focuses on stable individual differences. One might question the relevance of these differences in an applied context. However, there is reason to believe that individual differences might partially be a function of experience and knowledge of selection tests. Thus, it might be possible to alter an individual's dispositions toward faking and their reactions to personality testing, with the aim of minimizing the detrimental effects of faking behavior. The current understanding of dispositions and reactions can help guide our thinking about how applicant's strategies can be manipulated in order to enhance the validity of personality tests. Such information could also help guide practitioners in the design of instructions for applicants.

REFERENCES

Ajzen, I. (1985). From intentions to actions: A theory of planned behavior. In J. Kuhl & J. Beckman (Eds.), *Action-Control: From Cognition to Behavior* (pp. 11-39). Heidelberg: Springer.

Arvey, R. D., Strickland, W., Drauden, G., & Martin, C. (1990). Motivational components of test taking. *Personnel Psychology*, *43*, 695-716.

Barrick, M.R., & Mount, M.K. (1991). The big five personality dimensions and job performance: A meta-analysis. *Personnel Psychology, 44*, 1-26.

Barrick, M.R., Mount, M.K., & Judge, T.A. (2001). Personality and performance at the beginning of the new millennium: What do we know and where do we go next? *International Journal of Selection and Assessment, 9*(1-2), 9-29.

Beck, L., & Ajzen, I. (1991). Predicting dishonest actions using the theory of planned behavior. Journal of Research in Personality, *25*, 285-301.

Chan, D., Schmitt, N., Jennings, D., Clause, C.S., & Delbridge, K. (1998). Applicant perceptions of test fairness: Integrating justice and self-serving bias perspectives. *International Journal of Selection and Assessment*, *6*, 232-239.

English, A.D. (2004). When personality traits need a frame of reference: Enhancing the predictive validity of non-cognitive measures. *Dissertation Abstracts International: Section B: The Sciences & Engineering, 64*, 5829.

Gilliland, S. W. (1994). Effects of procedural and distributive justice on reactions to a selection system. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 79*, 691-701.

Glode, J. (2002). Expanding the justice dilemma: A comparison of stakeholder reactions to personnel selection tools. *Dissertation Abstracts International: Section B: the Sciences and Engineering, 63*, 3053.

Ingerick, M., McFarland, L.A., Vasilopoulos, N.L., & Cucina, J.M. (2004, April). *Modeling the impact of applicant reactions on noncognitive test validity: An interactionist perspective.* Paper presented at the 19th Annual Conference of the Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology, Chicago.

Levin, R. A., & Zickar, M.J. (2002). Investigating self-presentation, lies, and bullshit: Understanding faking and its effects on selection decisions using theory, field research, and simulation. In J.M. Brett and F. Drasgow (Eds.), *The Psychology of Work: Theoretically Based Empirical Research* (pp. 253-276). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers.

McCrae, R.R., & Costa, P.T. (1995). Positive and negative valence within the Five Factor Model. *Journal of Research in Personality*, *29*, 443-460.

McFarland, L. A. (2000). Toward an integrated model of applicant faking. *Dissertation Abstracts International: Section B: the Sciences and Engineering, 61*, 2805.

McFarland, L. A., & Ryan, A.M. (2000). Variance in faking across noncognitive measures. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 85*, 812-821.

Mueller-Hanson, R. A., Heggestad, E.D., and Thornton, G.C. III. (2003). Individual differences in impression management: An exploration of the psychological processes underlying faking. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 88,* 348-355.

Ployhart, R. E., & Ryan, A.M. (1998). Applicants' reactions to the fairness of selection

procedures: The effects of positive rule violations and time of measurement. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *83*, 3-16.

Robie, C., Born, M.P., & Schmit, M.J. (2001). Personal and situational determinants of personality responses: A partial reanalysis and reinterpretation of the Schmit et al. (1995) data, *Journal of Business and Psychology, 16,* 101-117.

Rosse, J. G., Miller, J.L., & Stecher, M.D. (1994). A field study of job applicants' reactions to personality and cognitive ability testing. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *79*, 987-992.

Ryan, A. M., & Sackett, P.R. (1987). Pre-employment honesty testing: fakability, reactions of test takers, and company image. *Journal of Business and Psychology, 1*, 248-256.

Rynes, S. L., & Connerly, M.R. (1993). Applicant reactions to alternative selection procedures. *Journal of Business and Psychology*, *7*, 261-277.

Schmit, M. J., & Ryan, A.M. (1997). Applicant withdrawal: The role of test-taking attitudes and racial differences. *Personnel Psychology, 50*, 855-876.

Schmit, M.J., Ryan, A.M., Stierwalt, S.L., & Powell, A.B. (1995). Frame-of-reference effects on personality scale scores and criterion-related validity. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 80*, 607-620.

Seiler, S.N., & Kuncel, N.R. (2005). Modeling the individual difference determinants of faking: Integration and extension. Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology, Los Angeles, CA, April 2005.

Snell, A. F., Sydell, E.J., & Lueke, S.B. (1999). Towards a theory of applicant faking: Integrating studies of deception. *Human Resource Management Review*, *9*, 219-242.

Tellegen, A., Grove, W.M., & Waller, N.G. (1991). *Inventory of Personal Characteristics #7 (IPC7).* Unpublished materials, University of Minnesota.

Viswesvaran, C., & Ones, D.S. (1999). Meta-analysis of fakability estimates: Implications for personality measurement. *Educational and Psychological Measurement, 59,* 2, 197-210.

Table 1. Faking Dispositions and Reactions Questionnaire (FDRQ)

Item	Content Area
1. Lying on the test would be a good thing to do.	Attitude Toward Faking
2. Lying on the assessment would be an unpleasant thing to do.	Attitude Toward Faking
3. It would be foolish to lie on the test.	Attitude Toward Faking
4. It would be useful to lie on the assessment.	Attitude Toward Faking
5. Giving dishonest responses would be a beneficial thing to do.	Attitude Toward Faking
6. If I lied on the test, most of the people who are important to me would disapprove.	Subjective Norms
7. Most people who are important to me will look down on me if I lied.	Subjective Norms
8. No one who is important to me thinks it is OK to lie on a selection test.	Subjective Norms
9. My parents would approve of me lying on the measure.	Subjective Norms
10. If I lied on the assessment, my friends would approve.	Subjective Norms
11. An employer could not prevent me from lying on the test.	Perceived Control
12. There is nothing that I could do to improve my performance on the test.	Perceived Control
13. Even if I wanted to, I wouldn't know how to make myself look better on the assessment.	Perceived Control
14. There are situational factors that might prevent me from being able to lie on the evaluation.	Perceived Control
15. Nothing could stop me from exaggerating the truth on the test if I wanted to.	Perceived Control
16. I would never respond dishonestly on an employer's personality assessment.	Intention to Fake
17. Even if I had a good reason, I could NOT bring myself to give dishonest responses.	Intention to Fake
18. I would just try to look like myself when responding.	Intention to Fake
19. I would respond dishonestly if there was a lot of competition for the job.	Intention to Fake
20. I would respond dishonestly on the assessment if I really wanted a particular job.	Intention to Fake
21. I would respond dishonestly if I really needed the job.	Intention to Fake
22. It is not appropriate to use the measure to make employment decisions.	Fairness Perceptions
23. Applicants would get a fair outcome as a result of their responses to the items.	Fairness Perceptions
24. I feel that using the test to select applicants for a job is unfair.	Fairness Perceptions
25. I would have great faith in an employer's capacity to accurately evaluate my responses.	Fairness Perceptions
26. It is perfectly appropriate for an employer to administer the instrument to applicants.	Fairness Perceptions

Table 1, continued. Faking Dispositions and Reactions Questionnaire (FDRQ)

27. Applicants who perform well on the test will perform no better on the job than applicants who perform poorly.	Predictive Validity
28. I am confident that the assessment can predict how well an applicant will perform on the job.	Predictive Validity
29. An employer can't tell much about an applicant's ability to do the job from his/her responses to the measure.	Predictive Validity
30. Applicants who perform well on the evaluation will perform well on the job.	Predictive Validity
31. I am confident that an employer can use the personality test to predict how well an applicant will perform a job.	Predictive Validity
32. I understand what the items have to do with a job.	Face Validity
33. I cannot see any relationship between the test and what is required on the job.	Face Validity
34. It would be obvious to anyone that the content of the assessment is related to what is required in a job.	Face Validity
35. The actual content of the personality instrument is clearly related to job tasks.	Face Validity
36. There is no real connection between the examination and job tasks.	Face Validity
37. I would have to lie in order for my responses to look good.	Perceived Ability
38. I think that I would look good to an employer if I responded completely honestly.	Perceived Ability
39. I would look like a good employee just responding honestly on the assessment.	Perceived Ability
40. I would not have to lie in order to do good on the evaluation.	Perceived Ability
41. If I responded honestly to the items, I would not look like a good job candidate.	Perceived Ability
42. I would want to be among the top scorers on the test.	Motivation
43. Doing well on the assessment would be important to me.	Motivation
44. I would want to try my best on the evaluation.	Motivation
45. I would not care how well I perform on the instrument.	Motivation
46. I would not be very motivated to do well on the measure.	Motivation
47. Employers are able to detect when someone is faking his or her responses.	Detection
48. Psychologists are able to detect when someone is faking his or her answers.	Detection
49. If I lied on the evaluation and was hired, my employer would figure out that I had lied.	Detection
50. It would be impossible to tell when a person had lied on the test.	Detection
51. Employers have no way of knowing whether a person may have exaggerated the truth on a personality assessment.	Detection
52. I would not feel guilty if I exaggerated the truth on the test.	Moral Convictions
53. Lying on the instrument would go against my principles.	Moral Convictions
54. It would be morally wrong for me to stretch the truth on the test.	Moral Convictions
55. My values would prohibit me from faking my responses to the items on the assessment.	Moral Convictions

Table 2. Descriptive statistics from laboratory study.

Variable	Mean	SD	N	Reliability Estimate
Honest Conscientiousness	3.04	.47	115	.85
Applicant Conscientiousness	3.14	.44	111	.82
Conscientiousness Difference Score	0.10	.65	111	.84
Faking Dispositions	3.05	.95	115	.95
Test Outcomes (reverse)	3.71	.84	115	.88
Test Valuation	4.43	.61	115	.83

Note. Faking Dispositions = AF (Attitude Toward Faking) + SN (Subjective Norms) + MC (Moral Convictions) + INT (Intention); Test Outcomes = PV (Predictive Validity) + FP (Fairness Perceptions); Test Valuation= FV (Face Validity) + MOT (Motivation) + PA (Perceived Ability). All reliability estimates, with the exception of the Conscientiousness difference score, are coefficient alphas. The reliability estimate for the Conscientiousness difference score is calculated by the formula for difference scores given in Traub, 1994**.**

Table 3. Correlations of FDRQ Factors with Conscientiousness Difference Scores.

FDRQ Content Area	Conscientiousness Difference Score
Faking Dispositions	.02
Test Outcomes (reverse)	.20*
Test Valuation	-.12

Note. N=111. Faking Dispositions = AF (Attitude Toward Faking) + SN (Subjective Norms) + MC (Moral Convictions) + INT (Intention); Test Outcomes = PV (Predictive Validity) + FP (Fairness Perceptions); Test Valuation= FV (Face Validity) + MOT (Motivation) + PA (Perceived Ability). * denotes an effect that is statistically significant at $p < .05$

Table 4. Results of Regression Analysis of Conscientiousness Difference Score on Test Outcomes and Faking Dispositions

				Correlations	
Model	**B**	**R^2**	**ΔR^2**	**Zero-Order**	**Partial**
1: (constant) Test Outcomes (reverse)	-.49 .16*	.04	.04	.20*	.20*
2: (constant) Test Outcomes (reverse) Faking Dispositions	-.42 .19* -.06	.05	.01	.02	-.08
3: (constant) Test Outcomes (reverse) Faking Dispositions Interaction	-.44 .19* -.06 .08	.06	.01	.09	.09

Note. n = 111. * denotes an effect that is statistically significant at $p < .05$

Table 5. Results of Regression Analysis of Conscientiousness Difference Score on Test Outcomes and Test Valuation

				Correlations	
Model	**B**	**R^2**	**ΔR^2**	**Zero-Order**	**Partial**
1: (constant) Test Outcomes (reverse)	-.49 .16*	.04*	.04*	.20*	.20*
2: (constant) Test Outcomes (reverse) Test Valuation	-.14 .15* -.07	.04	.00	-.12	-.06
3: (constant) Test Outcomes (reverse) Test Valuation Interaction	-.31 .19* -.08 -.32*	.10*	.05*	-.16*	-.23*

Note. n = 111. * denotes an effect that is statistically significant at $p < .05$

Table 6. Correlations between FDRQ content areas and Conscientiousness Difference Score

FDRQ Content Area	**Conscientiousness Difference Score**
Attitude Toward Faking	.12
Subjective Norms	-.00
Moral Convictions	.12
Intention to Fake	.14
Predictive Validity	-.20*
Fairness Perceptions	-.09
Face Validity	-.12
Perceived Ability	-.05
Motivation	-.11
Detection	-.10
Perceived Control	.09

Note. n = 111. * denotes an effect that is statistically significant at $p < .05$