

Modeling the Individual Difference Determinants of Faking: Integration and Extension

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Personality testing is consistently shown to be one of the least well-received methods of employee selection among applicants (Rosse, Miller, & Stecher, 1994). There is reason to be concerned about the impact of negative reactions toward personality testing—negative reactions are associated with decreased test-taking motivation (Rynes & Connerly, 1993), withdrawal from the application process (Chan, Schmitt, Jennings, Clause, & Delbridge, 1998; Rynes & Connerly, 1993), and a lowered intention to recommend the organization to others (Chan et al., 1998; Gilliland, 1994; Ployhart & Ryan, 1998; Rynes & Connerly, 1993; Schmit & Ryan, 1997). In addition, Ingerick, McFarland, Vasilopoulos, & Cucina (2004) demonstrated that an individual's reactions are related to faking behavior. A related, emerging line of research indicates that individual differences in perceptions regarding dishonest responding, as well as certain personality traits such as low conscientiousness, may predict the tendency to distort responses on (i.e., to fake) a job application personality test (McFarland, 2000; Mueller-Hanson, Heggstad, & Thornton, 2003; Snell, Sydell, & Lueke, 1999).

Faking on a pre-employment personality assessment refers to the extent to which applicants misrepresent their personality in order to create a more favorable impression. The results of several studies have lead some to conclude that if applicants do fake, they do not do so to a degree in which the prediction of performance declines (e.g., Barrick & Mount, 1996; Cunningham, Wong, & Barbee, 1994; Hough, Eaton, Dunnette, Kamp & McCloy, 1990; Ones & Viswesvaran, 1998; Ones, Viswesvaran, & Reiss, 1996). However, these conclusions focus on operationalizations of faking that describe the applicant pool as a whole. Individual differences in self-presentations certainly exist and

may influence selection utility. Support for this conclusion can be found in Levin & Zickar (2000) as well as Rosse, Stecher, Miller, & Levin (1998).

The Need for Further Integration

The literature suggests that individual differences exist in the extent to which applicants present themselves favorably and that these behaviors may have important effects on selection decisions. It is consequently important to model the individual difference factors that contribute to faking behavior. Although numerous authors have proposed similar models of these differences, each model remains relatively independent. Individual studies can provide information on what variables are likely to be predictive of faking; however, it is difficult to compare results across studies in the absence of a common label for and measure of these determinants. Attempting to advance the prediction of faking from isolated variables is less effective than what could be achieved through an integrated framework and more precise measurement.

The primary goal of the current studies was to explore the relationships among the factors that are likely to be predictive of faking behavior. This paper responds to Ryan and Ployhart's (2000) call for the improved measurement of applicant reactions (which they label *perceptions*) as opposed to just "using the scale most commonly used" (pg. 584); we address their call by proposing an integrated model and preliminary framework for measuring the individual difference determinants of faking. We first reviewed the literature to determine the attitudes, reactions, and personality variables that have been predictive of faking behavior in laboratory studies. From this review, we determined that there are at least two categories of variables that are likely to aid in our understanding of the individual differences which influence faking behavior, which we label *dispositional*

and *reactive* determinants. Dispositional determinants include attitudes and personality traits. Reactive determinants include perceptions of validity and fairness as well as motivation. We then created a questionnaire to measure the variables that fall into these two categories as well as additional factors that may demonstrate more complex relationships. We will now describe the Ingerick et al. (2004) model of response strategy, which supports our categorization, and provide a rationale for a more thoroughly integrated model.

Ingerick et al. (2004) describe an interactionist perspective of response strategy in which individual differences in strategy are a function of an applicant's disposition to engage in dishonest responding and reactions to a specific assessment. That is, an individual's tendency to respond in a certain manner is likely to be a function of both the disposition of the applicant and his or her beliefs about the validity and fairness of the test. Although this is a useful framework it unfortunately uses a self-monitoring as the sole indicator of disposition towards dishonest responding is questionable. High self-monitors are characterized as individuals who adapt their behaviors to gain advantage in social situations. Self-monitors might adapt their responses on a personality test to reflect their corresponding self-monitoring behaviors while at work (Barrick, Parks, & Mount, 2004). Therefore, a self-monitoring scale is likely to be most predictive of this particular, *adaptive* response strategy.

Research on the nature of self-monitoring leads us to conclude that it is unlikely self-monitoring will demonstrate a simple relationship with a broader range of faking strategies. We chose to revise the dispositional component of faking behavior by considering the factors that have been shown to result in an individual's *intention* to

engage in faking behavior. Intentions are considered to be proximate determinants of behavior (Ajzen, 1985; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). Accordingly, the intention to fake is likely to be a more precise indicator of a wide variety of faking strategies as opposed to just the adaptive, self-monitoring style. From our literature review, we determined that attitudes toward faking, subjective norms toward faking, perceived control over faking, motivation, and personality traits are likely to be predictive of the intention to fake and subsequent faking behavior. We will now describe the extant research on the dispositional and reactive determinants of faking and outline the expected relationships among these determinants.

Research on the Determinants of Faking

Dispositional Determinants

Theory of planned behavior variables. Utilizing Ajzen's (1985) theory of planned behavior, McFarland (2000) examined the determinants of the intention to fake a job application personality test and the subsequent effect of intention on faking behavior. According to the theory, intentions are the result of an individual's attitudes toward a behavior, his/her subjective norms regarding the behavior, and his/her perceptions of control over performing the behavior. An attitude toward a behavior is an overall evaluation of a behavior in terms of dimensions such as pleasant—unpleasant, good—bad, and wise—foolish. One's subjective norms are those related to the perceived social pressure to perform or not perform a behavior. One's perception of control is his/her belief regarding how easy or difficult a behavior is to perform in the presence of personal or situational barriers (Ajzen, 1985). The theory of planned behavior and its predecessor the theory of reasoned action have been used successfully to predict intentions and

behaviors in a variety of situations ranging from voting (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1981) to engaging in dishonest behaviors such as cheating, shoplifting, and lying (Beck & Ajzen, 1991).

McFarland (2000) found limited support for a model of faking based on the theory of planned behavior. The general intention to fake a selection test (note: not specifically labeled a personality test) predicted moderate score elevation on the Big Five scales of Extroversion, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness. The observed correlations between the intention to fake and difference scores computed between an honest and applicant condition for these dimensions were .11, .14, and .20, respectively.

Variables that are conceptually similar to the theory of planned behavior's attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived control have been proposed by Mueller-Hanson et al. (2003), Snell et al. (1999), and McFarland & Ryan (2000) as predictors of the intention to fake. For example, McFarland & Ryan's (2000) model considers the role that *values* and *beliefs toward faking* have on the intention to fake. Values and beliefs toward faking are similar to attitudes and subjective norms. Mueller-Hanson et al. (2003) combine perceived control and subjective norms, along with the belief in the importance of faking (which contains an attitude component), into a single determinant labeled *perceptions of the situation*. The theory of planned behavior appears to encompass most of the variables that have been used to examine an individual's willingness or intention to engage in faking behavior. The theory thus appears to provide a reasonable and clean framework for modeling the intention component of faking. Therefore, we included in our questionnaire measures of attitudes toward faking, subjective norms toward faking,

perceived control over faking, and the intention to fake. All items were adapted from McFarland (2000).

Perceived ability. Perceived ability refers to an individual's belief regarding how his/her completely honest responses would look to an employer. Although this variable, to our knowledge, has not been reported in the literature, we expect that it will demonstrate important relationships with the intention to fake. An applicant with strong attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control regarding faking might not intend to respond dishonestly if he/she believes his or her honest responses will result in a good score. We included a measure of perceived ability to examine this expected relationship.

Reactive Determinants

Validity and fairness reactions. The study of reactions to testing has a long history within the organizational literature. Despite this history, research regarding the influence of reactions on non-cognitive test behavior is sparse. Ingerick et al. (2004) report what is to our knowledge the only study that addresses the influence of validity and fairness beliefs on faking behavior. These beliefs can be dependent on several factors, including an individual's past experience with similar tests, his/her knowledge of testing principles, and his/her evaluation of the items on the test at hand. Accordingly, validity and fairness beliefs are *reactive*, or dependent on an individual's unique set of experiences. Reactions to the validity and fairness of an assessment can function to either increase or suppress an individual's likelihood of dishonest responding. For example, belief that an assessment is valid and fair could function as an indication that the applicant should "play by the rules" (Ingerick et al., 2004, p. 4). Conversely, the

perception that the assessment is valid may further incline an applicant to consider distorting their responses in order to obtain the job. Ingerick et al. (2004) found that perceptions were moderately related to faking behavior as operationalized by difference scores on each Big Five personality dimension. Specifically, they found that fairness perceptions and predictive validity were correlated with conscientiousness, extraversion, and emotional stability difference scores, with correlations in the range of $-.10$ to $-.15$. We included measures of face validity, predictive validity, and fairness in order to further examine the relationships among these individual perceptions. Items were adapted from Smither et al. (1993). Similar items were utilized in Ingerick et al. (2004).

Motivation. The motivational component of test-taking behavior is a widely employed variable in the test-taking literature. Motivation in the scope of this study refers to the reported desire to do well on an assessment (see Arvey, Strickland, Drauden, & Martin, 1990—Motivation factor of the Test Attitude Survey). Motivation is not the same as the intention to fake; rather, it is an indication that doing well is important to the individual. It is important to make this distinction, as some authors use the term “motivation to fake” to refer generally to a category composed of a collection of more specific determinants (for example, see Snell et al., 1999).

Schmit and Ryan (1992) found that the criterion-related validity of a personality test was lower for a sample with greater positive test-taking motivation. The effect might have been due to an increase in conscious response distortion. We anticipate that motivation will play a role in the prediction of faking behavior. Additionally, Mueller-Hanson et al. (2003) and McFarland & Ryan (2000) both state that an applicant who is motivated score well must believe that it is important to acquire a good score on the

assessment. Validity and fairness reactions are good indicators of this belief. We thus expect motivation to be strongly related to validity and fairness reactions. It is not a reaction *per se*; rather, we expect motivation to be a function of reactions as well as other variables such as desire for obtaining a particular job, which we do not address here. We included a measure of motivation adapted from the motivation items of the Test Attitudes Survey (Arvey et al., 1990).

Additional Determinant: Belief in Detection

Belief in detection refers to an individual's belief that employers or psychologists are able to detect dishonest responding. We expect detection to be related to both the intention to fake as well as validity and fairness reactions. Detection should suppress the intention to fake by decreasing otherwise positive attitudes towards faking. That is, an individual is less likely to report that dishonest responding is wise/good if he or she believes this strategy will be detected. Detection should also be a function of one's validity and fairness reactions. We expect that those who believe in the legitimacy of a test will be more likely to believe scores can be interpreted by the organization without error. We therefore included a measure of belief in detection in the questionnaire.

Personality

Several researchers have indicated that personality is likely to be related to faking behavior (McFarland & Ryan, 2000; Mueller-Hanson et al., 2003; Snell et al., 1999). However, there is a lack of consensus regarding which personality dimensions are related to faking as well as conflicting theories on the direction of these relationships. To provide a replication and extension, in Study 2 we examined personality correlates of test attitudes, reactions, and intention to fake using a measure that covers the Big Five but

also provides information about Positive and Negative Valence, two strongly evaluative traits. The inclusion of these evaluative traits in a study focused on faking seems particularly appropriate.

The above literature indicates that there are at least two broad determinants of individual differences in faking behavior. Consequently, we first expected that the scales within the questionnaire would fall into at least two categories. Specifically, we hypothesized that the dispositional determinants (attitudes, subjective norms, perceived control, intention, and perceived ability) would be relatively independent of the reactive determinants (validity/fairness beliefs and motivation). As mentioned previously, positive validity and fairness beliefs might function to increase *or* suppress faking intentions. Validity and fairness beliefs as well as motivation may demonstrate a more complex relationship with faking than through the direct influence of intention. Therefore, we had no expectations for the direction of any relationship between the dispositional and reactive factors. Our second expectation was that belief in detection would demonstrate direct relationships with both the intention to fake and validity beliefs. Specifically, we hypothesized that belief in detection correlates negatively with intention and positively with positive validity beliefs. As a result, we expect that belief in detection might not load cleanly onto a single factor.

Study 1

Method

Participants. Participants were 136 Introductory Psychology undergraduates from a large midwestern university who participated in order to fulfill a course requirement.

Data for this study were collected as part of a larger study involving a series of

questionnaires. Approximately 20% of the participants reported having previous experience with pre-employment personality testing.

Measures and Procedure

Faking Dispositions and Reactions Questionnaire. Participants first responded to the 60-item questionnaire designed to measure the dispositional and reactive variables outlined above. Participants were asked to give their candid opinions about the use of personality testing in making employment decisions. Responses were made on a 6-point scale, ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. As mentioned above, items for some of the scales were adapted from the following: McFarland's (2000) attitude, subjective norm, perceived control, and intention scales; Smither et al.'s (1993) validity and fairness perceptions scales; and Arvey et al.'s (1990) motivation scale. The items in the questionnaire were presented in random order.

Results

To examine the relationship among the scales in the Faking Dispositions and Reactions Questionnaire, we first factor analyzed these data using exploratory factor analysis. The questionnaire initially included 60 items. We dropped some items from the questionnaire to simplify further analyses, resulting in a reduced scale of 38 items. This reduced scale demonstrated comparable scale reliabilities and factor structure. Factors were extracted using Maximum Likelihood estimation and were rotated using Direct Oblimin. Two, three, and four-factor solutions were examined. The four-factor solution was judged to poorly reflect the data. The two-factor solution demonstrated the expected two-factor relationship among the variables. However, after examining the content of the

items loading onto a third factor, we determined that a substantive third factor might be worth retaining.

The first factor was named *Dispositions*. It generally reflects statements about likely response strategies on a personality test. Representative items include “A person would be foolish to respond completely honestly on a personality test and “I would respond dishonestly on a personality test if there was a lot of competition for the job.” Items assessing perceived ability also loaded (negatively) on this first factor. Interestingly, we found that items written to assess perceived control over faking did load highly on the first factor. This finding will be discussed further in our Study 2 results.

The second factor was named *Reactions*. It reflects perceptions regarding the validity and fairness of personality testing. Representative items include “It is perfectly appropriate for an employer to administer a personality test, and “I am confident that a personality test can predict how well an applicant will perform on the job.”

The third factor was named *Employer Test Valuation*. It includes a combination of both dispositional and reactive items that also load on factors 1 and 2. We interpret this factor to be an indicator of one’s understanding that employers consider high scores to represent meaningful relationships with job performance and will consequently use these scores in making hiring decisions. This understanding then leads one to strive for a high score, whether through increased motivation or faking. We distinguish this from general validity beliefs by noting an individual can believe a test is valid but lack faith that an employer will use this information as a major factor in deciding which applicants to hire. We feel it is important to further examine the meaning of this potential third factor in future research. Representative items include, “I would want to be among the top scorers

on a job application personality test,” “I would respond dishonestly on a personality test if there was a lot of competition for the job,” and “My chances of getting a job would increase if I made myself look better on a personality test.” Factor 3 correlates positively with Factors 1 and 2, indicating that positive disposition towards faking and positive validity and fairness beliefs are associated with positive scores on Factor 3.

Based on the results of Study 1, we created a revised questionnaire in order to provide a replication and to further examine the relationships among the items.

Study 2

Method

Participants. Participants were 120 Introductory Psychology undergraduates from a large midwestern university who participated in order to fulfill a course requirement. Data for this study were collected as part of a larger study designed to assess faking behavior. Approximately 44% of the participants reported having previous experience with pre-employment personality testing.

Measures and Procedure

Faking Dispositions and Reactions Questionnaire. Participants responded to a revised 55-item questionnaire designed to measure the same determinants examined in Study 1. Items from Study 1 that resulted in low item-total correlations within their respective scales were removed, and new items were written to better reflect the content of the scale. An additional determinant, labeled Moral Convictions, was added to assess how individual’s moral beliefs and values relate to faking dispositions and/or reactions. Three of the four items were adapted from Beck and Ajzen (1991), who found that moral beliefs were more strongly related to the intention to engage in cheating behaviors than

was perceived behavioral control. The items in the questionnaire were presented in random order.

Personality. Personality was measured using the 70-item Inventory of Personal Characteristics #7 (IPC7; Tellegen, Grove, & Waller, 1991). Five of the seven factors of the IPC7 can be used as approximate measures of the Big Five personality traits (McCrae & Costa, 1995). Positive emotionality is related to what is commonly labeled Extraversion. Negative emotionality relates to the Big Five trait of Neuroticism. Conventionalism is the negative pole of what is commonly labeled Openness to Experience. Due to the design of the larger study in which this Inventory was utilized, participants responded in relation to their personality at work.

Results and Discussion

Factor Analysis of the Faking Dispositions and Reactions Questionnaire. Factors were extracted using Maximum Likelihood estimation and were rotated using Direct Oblimin. The parallel analysis shown in Figure 1 indicates that we might expect six factors to fit the data reasonably well. Two- to six- factor solutions were examined. The four- and five-factor solution was judged to poorly reflect the data. The two-factor solution again demonstrated the expected simple structure among the Reactions and Dispositions items. Three- and six-factor solutions provided a reasonable fit to the data. Two items (one Detection scale item and one Predictive Validity item) were removed from the questionnaire due to their low loadings on all factors as well as their low item-total correlations. Additionally, we considered the Detection item to be somewhat vague and the Predictive Validity item to be overly complex. Below, we outline the three-factor

solution and discuss the potential hierarchical structure of the Questionnaire. The three-factor solution is presented in Table 1. The six-factor solution is presented in Table 2.

The first factor was again labeled *Dispositions*. It generally reflects statements about likely response strategies on a personality test. Once again, we found that items written to assess perceived control over faking did load highly on this first factor. Perceived ability again loaded (negatively) on the first factor.

The second factor was again named *Reactions*. It reflects perceptions regarding the perceived predictive validity and fairness of personality testing. Interestingly, items assessing the perceived Face Validity of personality tests did not all load highly on this second factor. We did not perceive any content differences among the items that did and did not load on the first factor. Further item refinement might be necessary in order to better distinguish Face and Predictive Validity beliefs.

The third factor was named *Test Meaning*. Items on this third factor are similar in content to those from the *Employer Test Valuation* factor found in Study 1. However, in Study 2 this third factor more clearly contained items from three scales, namely Motivation, Face Validity, and Perceived Ability, and was thus more interpretable than the third factor investigated in Study 1. We interpret this factor to represent and individual's beliefs that the items on a personality test assess important job-related content. This belief in Face Validity should motivate a person to want to score highly on a personality assessment. The Perceived Ability loadings are more difficult to interpret. Those with a high Perceived Ability are more likely to have a strong Motivation to perform highly and to believe in the Face Validity of personality tests. We speculate that those high in perceived ability are more likely to see the items on a personality test as

relevant to their own performance (face validity) and will thus want to score highly on the assessment, while those low in perceived ability might see the test as containing items irrelevant to their own (although equally high) performance.

Examining the six-factor solution, face validity emerges as a separate factor, and it becomes clearer that face validity is distinguishable from predictive validity and fairness perceptions. Belief in detection and motivation also emerge, to an extent, as separate factors. The content of the first factor is nearly identical to the first factor from the three-factor solution. Predictive validity and fairness perceptions also remain together in factor 2. The six-factor solution is presented in Table 2. Figure 2 shows the hypothetical hierarchical factor structure that could be expected to emerge more clearly upon further item refinement and a larger sample.

Scale Intercorrelations. The factor analysis indicates that it may be difficult to further distinguish among at least some of the scales that compose each factor. However, as these results are preliminary, we present scale correlations in Table 3. From this table, we get a clearer picture of how the individual scales are related. Attitudes toward faking, subjective norms, and perceived control all strongly relate to the intention to fake, with corrected correlations of .90, .84, and .50, respectively. It is interesting that the magnitude of the perceived control/intention correlation is far lower than the correlations for attitudes and subjective norms. McFarland (2000) found similar relative magnitudes, with correlations of .74, .57, and .54. Ajzen (1991) notes that the relative contributions of each predictor of intention can vary among different types of behaviors. In perceived high-stakes situations such as employment testing, applicants may intend to fake even if they have low expectations of being able to do so successfully (McFarland, 2000). We

have provided additional support indicating that perceived control therefore might be a less meaningful predictor of an individual's intention to fake. Moral convictions, with a corrected correlation of .97 with intention, are a promising candidate for further investigation. As can also be seen in Table 3, the expected relationship between perceived ability and intention to fake did arise ($r = -.59$). We have therefore provided evidence that perceived ability may be an important indication of the intention to fake.

Table 3 also indicates the expected relationships between motivation and validity/fairness beliefs as well as the relationships among detection, intention, and validity/fairness beliefs. It is important that future research continues to examine the role of these variables.

Personality Relationships

As can be seen in Table 4, perceived ability may have important personality correlates. Specifically, it should be noted that both positive and negative valence are related to perceived ability (corrected correlations of .25 and -.31, respectively). Those who believe they are special, superior, or admirable (positive valence) reported higher perceived ability. Conversely, those who believe they are wicked, awful, or vicious reported a lower perceived ability. We note also that the magnitudes of the correlations between positive/negative valence and intention were uniformly low. Given the relative absence of theory regarding how personality traits relate to faking behavior, we choose to end the discussion here and simply present the table of correlations. We urge researchers to further consider the role that personality might play in faking behavior.

Conclusion

We see that this study makes three primary contributions. First, we have integrated the literature to develop and refine a test dispositions and reactions measure. Second, we have identified personality characteristics that are likely to be predictive of different test dispositions and reactions. Finally, we have identified specific dispositions and reactions that seem most strongly related to the intention to fake on a personality test and noted that a hierarchical factor structure might exist. We have also demonstrated that a potential third factor related to inferences regarding test meaning as well as motivation and perceived ability might be worthy of further investigation within the faking domain. Overall, we have found support for the general model proposed by Ingerick et al. (2004), which argues that the determinants of faking behavior can be categorized in terms of dispositions and reactions.

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Table 1

Results of Factor Analysis of Faking Dispositions and Reactions Questionnaire, 3-Factor Solution, Study 2

Items		Item content	Factor		
			1	2	3
1.	Lying on the test would be a good thing to do.	AF	0.728		
2.	It would be useful to lie on the assessment.	AF	0.705		
3.	It would be foolish to lie on the test.*	AF	0.688		
4.	Lying on the assessment would be an unpleasant thing to do.*	AF	0.659		
5.	Giving dishonest responses would be a beneficial thing to do.	AF	0.549		
6.	Most people who are important to me will look down on me if I lied.*	SN	0.748		
7.	If I lied on the test, most of the people who are important to me would disapprove.*	SN	0.658		
8.	My parents would approve of me lying on the measure.	SN	0.655		-0.385
9.	No one who is important to me thinks it is OK to lie on a selection test.*	SN	0.638		
10.	If I lied on the assessment, my friends would approve.	SN	0.511		
11.	My values would prohibit me from faking my responses to the items on the assessment.*	MR	0.856		
12.	I would not feel guilty if I exaggerated the truth on the test.	MR	0.739		
13.	Lying on the instrument would go against my principles.*	MR	0.656		-0.348
14.	It would be morally wrong for me to stretch the truth on the test.*	MR	0.631		
15.	I would respond dishonestly if there was a lot of competition for the job.	INT	0.846		
16.	I would respond dishonestly on the assessment if I really wanted a particular job.	INT	0.803		
17.	I would respond dishonestly if I really needed the job.	INT	0.800		
18.	I would never respond dishonestly on an employer's personality assessment.*	INT	0.792		
19.	Even if I had a good reason, I could NOT bring myself to give dishonest responses.*	INT	0.710		
20.	I would just try to look like myself when responding.*	INT	0.621		-0.258
21.	I think that I would look good to an employer if I responded completely honestly.	PA	-0.542		0.429
22.	I would look like a good employee just responding honestly on the assessment.	PA	-0.428		
23.	I would have to lie in order for my responses to look good.*	PA	-0.383		0.609
24.	I would not have to lie in order to do good on the evaluation.	PA	-0.365		0.436
25.	If I responded honestly to the items, I would not look like a good job candidate.*	PA	-0.308		0.332

Table 1, continued

Results of Factor Analysis of Faking Dispositions and Reactions Questionnaire, 3-Factor Solution, Study 2

Items		Item content	Factor		
			1	2	3
26.	Nothing could stop me from exaggerating the truth on the test if I wanted to.	PC	0.334	-0.281	
27.	Even if I wanted to, I wouldn't know how to make myself look better on the assessment.*	PC			
28.	There are situational factors that might prevent me from being able to lie on the evaluation.*	PC		-0.278	
29.	An employer could not prevent me from lying on the test.	PC		-0.328	
30.	There is nothing that I could do to improve my performance on the test.*	PC			
31.	I am confident that an employer can use the personality test to predict how well an applicant will perform a job.	PV		0.834	
32.	I am confident that the assessment can predict how well an applicant will perform on the job.	PV		0.656	
33.	Applicants who perform well on the evaluation will perform well on the job.	PV		0.515	
34.	An employer can't tell much about an applicant's ability to do the job from his/her responses to the measure.*	PV		0.458	
35.	Applicants would get a fair outcome as a result of their responses to the items.	FP		0.711	
36.	I would have great faith in an employer's capacity to accurately evaluate my responses.	FP		0.636	
37.	I feel that using the test to select applicants for a job is unfair.*	FP		0.625	
38.	It is perfectly appropriate for an employer to administer the instrument to applicants.	FP		0.619	
39.	It is not appropriate to use the measure to make employment decisions.*	FP		0.536	
40.	Employers have no way of knowing whether a person may have exaggerated the truth on a personality assessment.*	DET		0.386	
41.	If I lied on the evaluation and was hired, my employer would figure out that I had lied.	DET	-0.275	0.354	
42.	Employers are able to detect when someone is faking his or her responses.	DET		0.292	
43.	Psychologists are able to detect when someone is faking his or her answers.	DET		0.251	

Table 1, continued

Results of Factor Analysis of Faking Dispositions and Reactions Questionnaire, 3-Factor Solution, Study 2

	Items	Item content	Factor		
			1	2	3
44.	There is no real connection between the examination and job tasks.*	FV		0.496	0.289
45.	It would be obvious to anyone that the content of the assessment is related to what is required in a job.	FV		0.435	
46.	I cannot see any relationship between the test and what is required on the job.*	FV			0.403
47.	The actual content of the personality instrument is clearly related to job tasks.	FV		0.262	0.395
48.	I understand what the items have to do with a job.	FV			0.395
49.	Doing well on the assessment would be important to me.	MOT			0.696
50.	I would not care how well I perform on the instrument.*	MOT			0.545
51.	I would want to try my best on the evaluation.	MOT	-0.357		0.539
52.	I would not be very motivated to do well on the measure.*	MOT			0.522
53.	I would want to be among the top scorers on the test.	MOT			0.519
		Factor Intercorrelations	1	1.0	
			2	-0.301	1.0
			3	-0.084	0.149
					1.0

Note: N=116. Loadings of magnitude less than 0.25 are deleted. AF=attitude toward faking; SN=subjective norm toward faking; INT=intention to fake; MR=moral convictions; PA=perceived ability; PC=perceived behavioral control over faking; PV=predictive validity; FP=fairness perception; DET=belief in detection; FV=face validity; MOT=motivation.

* denotes reverse-scored item.

Table 2

Results of Factor Analysis of Faking Dispositions and Reactions Questionnaire, 6-Factor Solution, Study 2

	Items	Item content	Factor						
			1	2	3	4	5	6	
1.	Lying on the test would be a good thing to do.	AF	0.519					-0.480	
2.	It would be useful to lie on the assessment.	AF	0.635						
3.	It would be foolish to lie on the test.*	AF	0.473						
4.	Lying on the assessment would be an unpleasant thing to do.*	AF	0.434						
5.	Giving dishonest responses would be a beneficial thing to do.	AF	0.463						
6.	Most people who are important to me will look down on me if I lied.*	SN	0.553			-0.339			
7.	If I lied on the test, most of the people who are important to me would disapprove.*	SN	0.510			-0.385			
8.	My parents would approve of me lying on the measure.	SN	0.341					-0.500	
9.	No one who is important to me thinks it is okay to lie on a selection test.*	SN	0.496						
10.	If I lied on the assessment, my friends would approve.	SN	0.494						
11.	My values would prohibit me from faking my responses to the items on the assessment.*	MR	0.559					-0.328	
12.	I would not feel guilty if I exaggerated the truth on the test.	MR	0.782						
13.	Lying on the instrument would go against my principles.*	MR	0.258					-0.512	
14.	It would be morally wrong for me to stretch the truth on the test.*	MR	0.571						
15.	I would respond dishonestly if there was a lot of competition for the job.	INT	0.902						
16.	I would respond dishonestly on the assessment if I really wanted a particular job.	INT	0.865						
17.	I would respond dishonestly if I really needed the job.	INT	0.935						
18.	I would never respond dishonestly on an employer's personality assessment.*	INT	0.600						
19.	Even if I had a good reason, I could NOT bring myself to give dishonest responses.*	INT	0.628						
20.	I would just try to look like myself when responding.*	INT	0.264					-0.398	-0.326
21.	I think that I would look good to an employer if I responded completely honestly.	PA						0.591	
22.	I would look like a good employee just responding honestly on the assessment.	PA							0.296
23.	I would have to lie in order for my responses to look good.*	PA						0.898	
24.	I would not have to lie in order to do good on the evaluation.	PA						0.463	
25.	If I responded honestly to the items, I would not look like a good job candidate.*	PA						0.612	

Table 2, continued

Results of Factor Analysis of Faking Dispositions and Reactions Questionnaire, 6-Factor Solution, Study 2

	Items	Item content	Factor						
			1	2	3	4	5	6	
26.	Nothing could stop me from exaggerating the truth on the test if I wanted to.	PC	0.420						
27.	Even if I wanted to, I wouldn't know how to make myself look better on the assessment.*	PC			-0.259	-0.444			
28.	There are situational factors that might prevent me from being able to lie on the evaluation.*	PC		-0.346					
29.	An employer could not prevent me from lying on the test.	PC		-0.312					
30.	There is nothing that I could do to improve my performance on the test.*	PC		-0.253					
31.	I am confident that an employer can use the personality test to predict how well an applicant will perform a job.	PV		0.714					
32.	I am confident that the assessment can predict how well an applicant will perform on the job.	PV		0.612					
33.	Applicants who perform well on the evaluation will perform well on the job.	PV		0.427					
34.	An employer can't tell much about an applicant's ability to do the job from his/her responses to the measure.*	PV		0.542					
35.	Applicants would get a fair outcome as a result of their responses to the items.	FP		0.636					
36.	I would have great faith in an employer's capacity to accurately evaluate my responses.	FP		0.703					
37.	I feel that using the test to select applicants for a job is unfair.*	FP		0.660					
38.	It is perfectly appropriate for an employer to administer the instrument to applicants.	FP		0.574					0.298
39.	It is not appropriate to use the measure to make employment decisions.*	FP		0.562					
40.	Employers have no way of knowing whether a person may have exaggerated the truth on a personality assessment.*	DET							0.432
41.	If I lied on the evaluation and was hired, my employer would figure out that I had lied.	DET	-0.257	0.253					
42.	Employers are able to detect when someone is faking his or her responses.	DET							0.714
43.	Psychologists are able to detect when someone is faking his or her answers.	DET							0.635

Table 2, continued

Results of Factor Analysis of Faking Dispositions and Reactions Questionnaire, 6-Factor Solution, Study 2

	Items	Item content	Factor					
			1	2	3	4	5	6
44.	There is no real connection between the examination and job tasks.*	FV				-0.648		
45.	It would be obvious to anyone that the content of the assessment is related to what is required in a job.	FV		0.381		-0.356		
46.	I cannot see any relationship between the test and what is required on the job.*	FV				-0.707		
47.	The actual content of the personality instrument is clearly related to job tasks.	FV				-0.557		
48.	I understand what the items have to do with a job.	FV				-0.347		
49.	Doing well on the assessment would be important to me.	MOT			0.526	-0.388		
50.	I would not care how well I perform on the instrument.*	MOT			0.514	-0.526		
51.	I would want to try my best on the evaluation.	MOT				-0.269	0.389	0.274
52.	I would not be very motivated to do well on the measure.*	MOT			0.487	-0.344		
53.	I would want to be among the top scorers on the test.	MOT			0.538			
Factor Intercorrelations		1	1.0	-0.330	-0.178	-0.124	-0.358	-0.272
		2	-0.330	1.0	0.136	-0.164	0.102	0.261
		3	-0.178	0.136	1.0	-0.067	0.263	0.058
		4	-0.124	-0.164	-0.067	1.0	-0.147	0.016
		5	-0.358	0.102	0.263	-0.147	1.0	0.175
		6	-0.272	0.261	0.058	0.016	0.175	1.0

Note: N=116. Loadings of magnitude less than 0.25 are deleted. AF=attitude toward faking; SN=subjective norm toward faking; INT=intention to fake; MR=moral convictions; PA=perceived ability; PC=perceived behavioral control over faking; PV=predictive validity; FP=fairness perception; DET=belief in detection; FV=face validity; MOT=motivation.

* denotes reverse-scored item.

Table 3
Scale Descriptives, Intercorrelations, and Reliabilities, Study 2

Scale	Mean	S.D.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
1. Attitude Toward Faking	3.05	1.02	0.87	0.84	0.59	0.91	0.90	-0.55	-0.04	-0.49	-0.67	-0.37	-0.51
2. Subjective Norms	2.81	1.01	0.71	0.84	0.53	0.91	0.84	-0.42	-0.04	-0.29	-0.69	-0.46	-0.32
3. Perceived Control	4.15	0.80	0.44	0.38	0.62	0.53	0.50	-0.43	0.05	-0.48	-0.24	-0.09	-0.53
4. Moral Convictions	3.01	1.06	0.77	0.76	0.38	0.82	0.97	-0.30	0.02	-0.35	-0.72	-0.43	-0.45
5. Intention to Fake	3.33	1.09	0.80	0.73	0.37	0.83	0.90	-0.40	0.10	-0.32	-0.59	-0.28	-0.42
6. Predictive Validity	3.09	0.92	-0.45	-0.34	-0.30	-0.24	-0.34	0.79	0.34	0.88	0.36	0.29	0.54
7. Face Validity	4.08	0.76	-0.03	-0.03	0.04	0.02	0.05	0.26	0.75	0.35	0.24	0.48	0.08
8. Fairness Perceptions	3.45	0.89	-0.41	-0.24	-0.34	-0.28	-0.27	0.71	0.27	0.81	0.30	0.26	0.53
9. Perceived Ability	4.56	0.84	-0.55	-0.56	-0.17	-0.57	-0.50	0.28	0.18	0.24	0.78	0.63	0.30
10. Motivation	4.62	0.85	-0.31	-0.38	-0.06	-0.34	-0.23	0.23	0.37	0.21	0.49	0.80	0.18
11. Belief in Detection	3.49	0.80	-0.40	-0.24	-0.35	-0.34	-0.34	0.40	0.06	0.40	0.22	0.14	0.71

Note: N=116. Values on diagonal are alpha reliabilities. Correlations above diagonal are corrected for unreliability in both scales.

Table 4
Scale Correlations with IPC-7 Dimensions, Study 2

Scale	Pos Val	Neg Val	Pos Emot	Neg Emot	Consc	Agree	Conven
1. Attitude Toward Faking	0.02 0.02	0.15 0.17	-0.09 -0.11	-0.06 -0.07	-0.13 -0.15	-0.13 -0.17	-0.16 -0.19
2. Subjective Norm	-0.08 -0.10	0.04 0.05	-0.18 -0.22	0.03 0.04	0.01 0.01	0.05 0.06	-0.15 -0.19
3. Perceived Control	-0.04 -0.05	-0.13 -0.17	0.05 0.07	-0.10 -0.14	-0.23 -0.31	-0.12 -0.19	-0.17 -0.25
4. Moral Convictions	-0.05 -0.06	0.19 0.23	-0.07 -0.09	0.07 0.09	-0.05 -0.06	-0.08 -0.10	-0.15 -0.19
5. Intention to Fake	-0.03 -0.03	0.07 0.08	-0.08 -0.09	0.01 0.01	-0.09 -0.10	-0.05 -0.06	-0.14 -0.17
6. Predictive Validity	0.12 0.15	-0.08 -0.10	0.14 0.17	-0.09 -0.11	0.27 0.32	0.10 0.13	0.21 0.27
7. Face Validity	0.20 0.26	-0.17 -0.21	0.05 0.06	-0.12 -0.16	0.10 0.13	0.10 0.14	0.05 0.06
8. Fairness Perception	0.06 0.07	-0.14 -0.16	0.01 0.01	-0.14 -0.17	0.19 0.23	0.10 0.13	0.24 0.31
9. Perceived Ability	0.20 0.25	-0.25 -0.31	0.12 0.15	-0.02 -0.02	-0.01 -0.01	0.01 0.02	-0.08 -0.10
10. Motivation	0.17 0.21	-0.38 -0.46	0.17 0.21	-0.05 -0.06	0.16 0.20	0.13 0.18	0.12 0.15
11. Belief in Detection	0.18 0.24	-0.06 -0.08	0.03 0.04	0.00 0.00	0.12 0.15	-0.06 -0.08	-0.07 -0.09

Note. N=116. Pos Val=Positive Valence; Neg Val=Negative Valence; Pos Emot=Positive Emotionality; Neg Emot=Negative Emotionality; Consc=Conscientiousness; Agree=Agreeableness; Conven=Conventionality. Correlations in bold are corrected for unreliability in both scales.

Figure 1
Parallel Analysis of Faking Dispositions and Reactions Questionnaire, Study 2




Figure 2
Hierarchical Factor Structure

